

have to grapple with the phenomenon of globalization, the increasing political, economic, cultural, technological, and environmental interconnectedness of the world. How has globalization reshaped American foreign relations? To what extent has the globalizing process blurred boundaries and identities, and undermined the nation-state structure?

Related to the many questions about U.S. expansionism and the larger world are others that highlight how policy is made and how the process of decisionmaking shapes both the policy and the outcome. How have U.S. leaders gone about deciding to use the nation's power abroad, and has that exercise of power produced the results intended? Scholars also explore domestic politics and elections, presidential-congressional relations, the Constitution, bureaucracies, interest groups and elites, the media and public opinion, and individuals whose personalities mold perceptions and influence decisions. What role have nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational advocates for human rights, international peace, environmental protection, and other global reforms played in U.S. foreign policy?

One way to think about the different approaches presented very briefly in this opening chapter is to ask how each would explain specific events or relations, such as the United States entry into the First World War, the Japanese-American clashes that led to World War II in the Pacific, the origins and escalation of the Cold War, the launching of the Peace Corps, U.S. engagement in the Middle East, or the daunting specter of global terrorism. Does one approach or a combination of approaches carry more explanatory power?

The diversity of viewpoints in this introductory chapter affords us an opportunity to discover and understand the complexity of major problems in American foreign relations whose legacies persist today.



E S S A Y S

In the first essay, Thomas J. McCormick of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, introduces the “world systems theory” of international relations and emphasizes U.S. economic hegemony in a capitalist world system comprising core, periphery, and semiperiphery countries. In the twentieth century, the United States has possessed preponderant economic and military power and exercised political-ideological leadership, rising to the status of preeminent core country. But McCormick notes that hegemony is “impermanent”; great powers become rentier and warfare states, and decline inevitably sets in. In the second essay, Melvyn P. Leffler of the University of Virginia argues that the pursuit of national security—the defense of domestic core values and interests against external threats—best explains U.S. behavior abroad. According to Leffler, the national security approach demands that analysts distinguish between real and perceived threats and probe the inner meaning of “core values”—a label that refers to America’s bedrock cultural, economic, ideological, and political identity and institutions. Walter L. Hixson of the University of Akron in the third essay critically assesses how culture and mythmaking have nourished and reinforced structures of authority at home and spawned a militant U.S. foreign policy. According to Hixson, Americans have imagined a national identity that trumpets their exceptional place in history as agents of manly, Anglo-Saxon expansionism, Christian uplift, free enterprise, and political liberty. This deeply rooted “myth of America” has underpinned popular consent for hegemonic wars and marginalized dissenters as unpatriotic.

In the fourth essay, Laura McEnaney of Whittier College explores one aspect of American culture: gender. Although gender analysis is often associated with women’s history, she stresses that cultural constructions of femininity and masculinity are

embedded in all relationships of power. Foreign relations historians use gender analysis to understand symbolic linkages between domestic insecurities relating to changing gender roles and international insecurities that arise from external threats. Gendered language also reflects the world views of foreign policy officials, who often equate political and military weakness with femininity and imperial leadership with manliness. In the fifth essay, Michael L. Krenn of Appalachian State University in North Carolina explains the enduring power of racial thinking in U.S. foreign relations. Adaptable and resilient, racism facilitated territorial conquest in the nineteenth century, the pursuit of overseas markets at the turn of the twentieth century, and America's subsequent rise to global power.

In the final essay, J. Garry Clifford of the University of Connecticut examines the foreign policy decisionmaking process. He stresses how bureaucratic politics—the give-and-take bargaining within the U.S. government—shapes the implementation, and therefore the outcome, of foreign policy. Because of the tugging and hauling in policymaking, U.S. foreign relations did not always conform to its leader's intentions.

The World-System, Hegemony, and Decline

THOMAS J. McCORMICK

Since modern history began in the late fifteenth century, the earth's inhabitants have lived in three distinct types of environments: the capitalist world-system (or world economy), the external world (empires), or the minisystems of subsistence communities. For the past five hundred years, the dynamic growth and expansion of the world-system has been at the expense of the other two. The Ottoman Empire of the Turks disappeared, the Russian Empire of the Romanovs and the empire of the Manchus in China collapsed in revolutionary disarray, all victims of their archaic political systems and the inability of their quasi-feudal economies to compete with or alternatively to insulate themselves from the more dynamic and efficient economies of the capitalist world-system. Likewise, the minisystems of Eastern Europe, Ireland, the Americas, Africa, and Asia were, over time and despite great resistance, wrenched away from their subsistence, village agriculture and integrated into a cash nexus and the world market. By the late twentieth century, the remnants of the external world of empires, the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, had emerged from the containment and self-isolation of the Cold War and begun to experiment with market economies in place of command (planned) economies. Also by that time, the remaining isolated pockets of subsistence systems had virtually disappeared from the face of the earth. The revolutionary expansion of European capitalism and Mediterranean civilization, begun a half-millennium earlier, seemed about to reach its final, all-encompassing frontier. The world-system and the world itself seemed almost one—one world rather than three. . . .

During the [1980s], a number of academic observers have concluded that capitalism's tendency toward international fluidity eventually produced a configuration that could properly be described as a system, a combination of parts forming a complex, unitary whole. Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, in their epic

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studies of early European capitalism, concluded that such a system was in place by 1650. Others feel that it was not until the nineteenth century that an integrated global division of labor allowed capitalism to merit characterization as a system.

Studies advancing a world-system analysis (including this study) argue that there are three constants about that world-system, even though the particular forms it takes are always changing. First, there are always implicit geographical boundaries within that system, and they are essentially defined by the spatial limits of the world market economy at any given time. In our contemporary period, the term *free world* is essentially a synonym for the capitalist world-system. Cold War rhetoric may impart a more ideological twist to the phrase, but Nelson Rockefeller's chief aide got at its root in late 1941 when he declared that America was "committed to the fight for freedom of economic life and for freedom of the seas, in a word, the fight for a free world." Second, there is always a center or pole to the system, a dominant city that acts as the coordinating point and clearing house of international capital. Its location has shifted historically from the Mediterranean to Northern Europe to North America (and perhaps yet to Northeast Asia), but there is always a central metropolis, be it London in 1845 or New York in 1945.

Finally, the system consists of three successive zones, each performing a specialized function in a complex, international division of labor. *Core* countries (the First World) own most of the high-tech, high-profit enterprises. The *periphery* (the Third World) specializes in primary production of agricultural commodities and raw materials—they are the "hewers of wood and carriers of water." Between them, the *semiperiphery* (the Second World) performs intermediate functions of transport, local capital mobilization, and less complex, less profitable forms of manufacturing. Historically, there has been some limited mobility of individual nations between zones, including America's own transformation from a semiperipheral country in 1790 to a core country by 1890. Likewise, changing technology continually redefines what constitutes high-, intermediate-, or low-value enterprises. Textiles, steel, and shipbuilding might have been high-value activities in an earlier era but have become low- or intermediate-value in the contemporary age of electrical equipment. What remains constant are the zones themselves and the specialized (and unequally rewarded) division of labor among them. Hence, . . . [today] there is a world-system in which North America, Japan, and Europe constitute the core and specialize in electronics, capital goods, diversified agriculture, and finance; the less developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean basin, as the periphery, specialize in nonpetroleum raw materials and single-crop agriculture; and the newly industrializing countries (NICs), Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Israel, Iran, India, China, and those of Eastern Europe and the Pacific rim, as the semiperiphery, specialize in shipping, petroleum, credit transactions, and consumer goods manufacturing.

The emergence of a capitalist world economy coincided with the emergence of the modern nation-state as the prevailing political unit of governance, and the nation-state has both fostered and inhibited the capitalist world economy. On one hand, nation-states have often provided crucial stimulation of economic growth and development: their banking, taxation, credit, and internal improvement policies have frequently aided domestic entrepreneurs in accumulating capital and minimizing risks. On the other hand, those same nation-states have often

interfered with and impeded the fluidity and mobility of capital, goods, and labor across national boundaries. This nationalist bias is caused in part by nation-states being, by definition, wedded to specific territories and committed to the defense and sustenance of their citizens. In part, too, it reflects the uneven pace of capitalist development among countries, and the unequal division of labor and rewards that results from it. The frequent consequence has been an attempt by “have-not” countries to overtake “have” countries through nationalistic economic measures, often referred to as mercantilistic policies in earlier periods and, in our own time, as import-substitution policies (i.e., substitution of indigenous products for those previously imported). Whatever the cause of this nationalist bias, the resulting farm subsidies, military spending, protective tariffs, navigation laws, capital controls, and restricted currency convertibility have constituted serious obstacles to a free world of economic internationalism and interdependence in which capitalism, as a purely economic system, can realize its maximum efficiency and profitability. So, too, have the policies of territorial expansion that often accompany economic nationalism interfered, by seeking to monopolize whole regions of the earth for the benefit of a single national economy. Examples are the British mercantile empire of the eighteenth century and the Japanese Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of the twentieth. In sum, nation-states have tended to pursue policies of economic autarky—capitalism in one country or one self-contained trading bloc—and such approaches limit the options of capital in pursuit of maximum rewards.

Hegemony historically has operated to soften the contradiction between the internationalist imperatives of capitalism and the nationalist biases of political nation-states. In the context of the world-system, hegemony means that one nation possesses such unrivaled supremacy, such predominant influence in economic power, military might, and political-ideological leadership, that no other power, or combination of powers, can prevail against it. Economic supremacy is the indispensable base of hegemony, for all other forms of power are possible with it and no others possible, for very long, without it. Any hegemonic power must, simultaneously, contain the dominant financial center, possess a clear comparative advantage in a wide range of high-tech, high-profit industries, and function commercially as both the world’s major exporter and its major importer. Beyond mere economic power, it must possess clear military superiority and ideological hegemony as well. By fear or respect, it must be able to exert its political will over the rest of the system and command deference to its principles and policies.

Hegemony and the balance of power have been on opposing sides of the contradiction between economic internationalism and national autarky or self-sufficiency. The balance of power attempts to use the alignment of forces and, if necessary, war, to prevent any one power from achieving such preponderance that it could impose economic internationalism on autarkic-minded nations. A single hegemonic power, however, has a built-in incentive to force other nations to abandon their national capitalism and economic controls and to accept a world of free trade, free capital flows, and free currency convertibility. As the world’s dominant economic power, a hegemonic power has the most to gain from such a free world and the most to lose from nationalistic efforts to limit the free movement of capital, goods, and currencies. So the preponderant world power is unequivocally self-interested

in using its economic power, as workshop and banker of the free world, to create institutions and ground rules that foster the internationalization of capital. It finds it inherently advantageous to use its political power as ideologue of the world-system to preach the universal virtues of freedom of the seas, free trade, open door policies, comparative advantage, and a specialized division of labor. It finds it necessary to use its military power as global policeman to protect the international system against external antagonists, internal rebellions, and internecine differences: to be judge, jury, and executioner, insuring that the ground rules of internationalism are not impeded by either friend or foe.

Only twice in the history of the capitalist world economy has hegemony triumphed over balance of power as the prevailing structure of the international system. Great Britain functioned as hegemonic center between roughly 1815 and 1870, and the United States did so between roughly 1945 and 1970. (Others argue that the Dutch republic did so as well, in the late seventeenth century, but the argument seems rather forced.) In each instance, world war was crucial to the formation of hegemony. It radically redistributed power and wealth in ironic fashion, denying hegemony to a European continental power while bestowing postwar supremacy on its balance of power adversary.

In the first instance, France attempted through its Napoleonic Wars (constituting the first truly world war) to impose its dominance on the Eurasian heartland, the very center of European capitalism. Great Britain attempted to thwart that ambition through its traditional balance of power politics, and it ultimately prevailed. But the wars and attendant revolutions were so long, so destructive, so destabilizing that they temporarily obliterated the old balance of power system and left Great Britain the tacit sovereign of the post-Napoleonic world. In the second instance . . . , Germany, under both the Kaiser and Hitler, attempted to impose its dominance on the same Eurasian heartland, while Anglo-American balance of power diplomacy sought to prevent it. But the ironic consequence of World Wars I and II was, by denying hegemony to the Germans, to make it possible for the Americans to become the acknowledged leaders of the free world. In each case, hegemony made it nearly impossible for other core powers to use war as an instrument of diplomacy against each other—a Pax Britannica for the mid-nineteenth century and a Pax Americana for the mid-twentieth. In each case, hegemony blunted the forces of economic nationalism and facilitated greater global interdependence, enabling a freer and easier *exchange* of goods in the nineteenth century and the multinational *production* of goods in the twentieth.

Hegemony is always impermanent, as Great Britain discovered and the United States is discovering. Indeed, hegemony undermines the very economic supremacy upon which it necessarily must rest. Two related tendencies lead the preponderant power to neglect investment in its civilian research and production and to transform itself into a *rentier* nation and *warfare* state. There is a tendency to overinvest and lend overseas and to live off dividends and interests (renting out one's money, hence *rentier*). It happens because it is easy to do, since the hegemonic power is in a position to secure favorable treatment for its capital throughout the free world. It happens also because it is necessary, since higher wage bills make it more profitable to invest overseas than at home. The higher wage bills themselves are part of the burden of power: the necessity to demonstrate to managers and workers that there

are ample economic rewards for supporting an internationalist foreign policy with their votes, tax dollars, and conscription.

The tendency to overinvest abroad is compounded by the tendency to overinvest in military production. Essential to the hegemonic power's capacity to act as global policeman, military research and production receive favored treatment from the government in the form of state-subsidized high profits. The government becomes a more predictable and more profitable customer than private individuals and corporate consumers. The end result is to divert capital from civilian to military production, to the neglect of modernization needs of the domestic industrial plant. This disinvestment, as some term it, erodes over time the economic underpinnings of hegemony and makes it more difficult to compete with other core powers who have avoided the pitfalls of similar disinvestment. Moreover, like a snowball rolling downhill, the problems compound as the hegemon grows aware of its decline. Confronted with declining profitability in the civilian sector, it is likely to stress military spending even more as the easiest way to assure its capitalists of adequate returns—often spending far in excess of any plausible military purposes. Relatedly, it is likely to exploit its continuing function as world policeman to extort special privileges from its competitors: favored treatment for its currency, its trade, and its investments in exchange for continued police protection. In short, it is likely to become even more of a rentier or warfare economy and speed up the very decline it is trying to retard.

National Security, Core Values, and Power

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

National security policy encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats. This definition is important because it underscores the relation of the international environment to the internal situation in the United States and accentuates the importance of people's ideas and perceptions in constructing the nature of external dangers as well as the meaning of national identity and vital interests.

By encouraging students of American foreign policy to examine both the foreign and the domestic factors shaping policy, by obligating them to look at the structure of the international system as well as the domestic ideas and interests shaping policy, the national security approach seeks to overcome some of the great divides in the study of American diplomatic history. . . . Generally, realist historians believe that diplomatic behavior responds (or should respond) to the distribution of power in the international system; most revisionist and corporatist scholars and most historians who dwell on ideas and ideology assume that domestic economic requirements, social and cultural forces, and political constituencies are of overwhelming importance. By relating foreign threats to internal core values, the national security model encourages efforts to bridge the gaps between these

Excerpts from Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," from Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. Copyright © 2004 by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press.

divergent interpretative approaches, or, more precisely, to see that these variables must be studied in relation to one another and nuanced judgments made about how they bear on one another.

Although the national security approach acknowledges that power plays a role in the functioning of the international system and that interests shape the behavior of nations, it does not reify the salience of power or the centrality of interest in the construction of foreign policy. Indeed, in one of the most sophisticated approaches to the study of national security, Barry Buzan points out that realists who dwell on power and idealists who focus on peace often have obscured the meaning of national security, defined as the protection of core values from external threats. More recently, the most sophisticated approach to national security reconceptualizes the concept and takes explicit cognizance of the impact of culture and identity. National interests, argues Peter Katzenstein, “are constructed through a process of social interaction”; “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors.” States are social actors operating in social environments. National identity is constructed as a result of human agency, and external threats are measured in relation to their perceived impact on core values. . . .

External dangers come in many varieties. The historian of U.S. foreign policy must appraise the intentions and capabilities of the nation’s prospective foes. But that step is only the beginning. Views of a potential adversary, after all, are heavily influenced by perceptions of other variables such as the impact of technological change, the appeal of one’s own organizing ideology, the lessons of the past, and the structural patterns of the international system itself. . . .

In studying the systemic sources of foreign policy behaviors, the national security approach demands that analysts distinguish between realities and perceptions. This task, as simple as it sounds, is fraught with difficulty because it is often harder for historians to agree on what constitutes an actual danger than on what is a perceived threat. Nancy Mitchell shows, for example, that German imperial actions in the early 1990s engendered enormous feelings of insecurity and hostility among Americans, but that, in fact, German actions and policies were far less threatening than widely perceived. She analyzes how rhetoric, military images, and trade competition conjured up fears and shaped perceptions that were inconsistent with the realities of German behavior. Likewise, the very different interpretations of American diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s between “realists” on the one hand and “revisionists” or “corporatists” on the other hand rests in part on assessments of the degree of threat to vital U.S. security interests in the interwar years. If there were no real threats before the middle or late 1930s, then contemporary proponents of arms limitation treaties, arbitration agreements, and non-aggression pacts can be viewed as functional pragmatists seeking to create a viable liberal capitalist international order rather than as naïve idealists disregarding the realities of an inherently unstable and ominous balance of power.

Perceptions of events abroad, however, are themselves greatly influenced by the ideas, ideals, and core values of the perceiver. The national security approach demands that as much attention be focused on how the American government determines its core values as on how it perceives external dangers. The term *core values* is used here rather than *vital interests* because the latter implies something more material and tangible than is appropriate for a national security imperative. The

United States has rarely defined its core values in narrowly economic or territorial terms. Core values usually *fuse* material self-interest with more fundamental goals like the defense of the state's organizing ideology, such as liberal capitalism, the protection of its political institutions, and the safeguarding of its physical base or territorial integrity. . . .

The protection and pursuit of core values requires the exercise of power. Power is the capacity to achieve intended results. Power may be an end in itself as well as a means toward an end. In the twentieth century, power (including military power) derives primarily from economic capabilities. Power stems from the scale, vigor, and productivity of one's internal economy and its access to or control over other countries' industrial infrastructure, skilled manpower, and raw materials. Power is relative.

The chief characteristic of twentieth-century American foreign policy has been the willingness and capacity of the United States to develop and exert its power beyond its nineteenth-century range to influence the economic, political, and military affairs of Europe and Asia. This trend has manifested itself in the evolution of the Open Door policy, in the aid to the Allies in both world wars, in the wielding of American financial leverage, in the assumption of strategic obligations, in the deployment of troops overseas, in the provision of economic and military assistance, in the undertaking of covert operations, in the huge expenditures on armaments, in the growth of the American multinational corporation, and in the assumption of a hegemonic role over the world capitalist system. The national security approach helps to make sense out of these developments. Alterations in the distribution of power, changes in the international system, and developments in technology influence the perception of threat and the definition of core values and impel American officials to exercise power in varying ways. . . .

Although occasionally criticized for its disregard of ideological and cultural concepts, the national security approach to the study of American foreign relations should be conceived as perfectly congruent with these new directions of scholarship. Central to the national security approach is the concept of core values. National security is about the protection of core values, that is, the identification of threats and the adoption of policies to protect core values. The new studies on culture and ideology mesh seamlessly with the synthetic qualities of a national security paradigm because they help to illuminate the construction and meaning of core values. In his insightful book on social scientists and nation building in the Kennedy era, Michael Latham writes that "A larger, more deliberate analysis of ideology and identity . . . can open new areas of inquiry by introducing a less reductive analysis of the 'interests' that critics have typically discerned behind official discourse." And he concludes that "in the midst of a collapsing European colonial order, social scientists and Kennedy administration policymakers conceived of [modernization] as a means to promote a liberal world in which the development of 'emerging' nations would protect the security of the United States."

The fervor with which the United States waged the Cold War can only be grasped by understanding the role of ideology in the construction of American national identity. In his succinct, valuable volume on Manifest Destiny in American history, Anders Stephanson reminds us of the puritannical, millenarian, and religious impulses that infuse America's approach to the world. Other factors might have influenced the

Cold War, he writes, “but the operative framework in which they all fit is the story of American exceptionalism, with its missionary implications.” And this emphasis on American nationalist ideology, sometimes conflated with notions of an American century or a Wilsonian century, pulsates through the new foreign policy literature. “American nationalist ideology,” writes John Fousek, “provided the principal underpinning for the broad public consensus that supported Cold War foreign policy.”

But when translated into policy, the ideological fervor was always calibrated. . . .

Preponderance [overwhelming global power] and hegemony, as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have written, confer advantages and impose costs. If threats are exaggerated and commitments overextended, if one’s credibility is vested in the achievement of too many goals, one’s relative power will erode and one’s core values may become imperiled. There is an ominous dynamic influencing the behavior patterns of great powers. Whether or not the United States will succumb to it will depend on whether groups, bureaucracies, and individual policymakers can find a means of restoring a viable equilibrium among threats, core values, and the exercise of power.

Culture, National Identity, and the “Myth of America”

WALTER L. HIXSON

Foreign policy flows from cultural hegemony affirming “America” as a manly, racially superior, and providentially destined “beacon of liberty,” a country which possesses a special right to exert power in the world. Hegemonic national identity drives a continuous militant foreign policy, including the regular resort to war.

Having internalized this Myth of America, a majority, or at least a critical mass, of Americans have granted spontaneous consent to foreign policy militancy over the sweep of U.S. history. While specific foreign policies often provoke criticism, to be sure, national identity contains such criticism within secure cultural boundaries. Only by gaining a better understanding of the cultural construction of foreign policy and national identity can we hope to forge a new hegemony, a more equitable society, and a commitment to cooperative internationalism. . . .

Cultural analysis illuminates the remarkable continuity of U.S. foreign policy flowing from a distinctive national identity. Despite breathtaking socioeconomic and technological change—from royal charters to multinational corporations, from powder muskets to bunker-busting nuclear warheads—foreign policy has proven remarkably continuous. This seemingly ahistorical argument for continuity flows from a powerful identity of imperial nationalism. In the U.S. historiographic tradition, as [the American Studies Scholar Amy] Kaplan observes, most historians make the mistake “of viewing empire as a twentieth-century aberration, rather than as part of an expansionist continuum.” Diplomatic history has long been plagued by relative neglect of pre-World War II and especially pre-twentieth-century studies. . . .

Walter L. Hixson, “Culture, National Identity, and the ‘Myth of America’” from *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 1–2, 5–8, 12–15, 305–306. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

Only by locating the analysis within modernity can we fully grasp the continuity of U.S. foreign policy. Euro-American history emerged within the broader frame of modernity, which defined itself in contrast with others, perceived as primitive or backward. Modernity may be defined as a worldview emanating from Enlightenment rationalism in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries and exported globally from Europe through imperial expansion. Through Enlightenment principles white male elites understood and shaped their world within a universe they perceived as being ordered. Religious cosmologies remained deeply embedded in culture, to be sure, yet increasingly in the Age of Reason empowered European men sought to direct the forces of history rather than live in the shadow of an omnipotent God. At the same time, Europeans achieved a global reach, as revolutionary advances in shipbuilding and navigation enabled them to fan out across the seas to Africa, the Americas, and Asia. An Atlantic world community linked four continents, as Europeans set out to discover, map, classify, and conquer the natural world.

Gradually weakened by these forces of modernity, the structured order of the *ancien régime*, anchored by centralized church authority, monarchy, and aristocracy, imploded in a process that culminated in the U.S., French, and Latin American revolutions. Modernity required masses of people to define a new identity, to relocate themselves in a world in which conditions had undergone profound change. At this point, *culture* began to replace the *structure* of the *ancien régime* in establishing a foundation for the new modern world. Culture comprised the realm in which shared values and political meanings were digested, contested, constructed, and affirmed.

Modernity comprised a rational and reasoned worldview that Europeans came to view as the only legitimate path to progress. Modern international relations (foreign policy) evolved as technology enabled Westerners to transport their culture and way of life, which they equated with progress, under God, onto foreign shores. . . .

Colonialism and imperialism thus flowed from the aggressive expansion of a western European worldview that apotheosized its way of life as ordered, reasoned, and providentially sanctioned. By implication, those peoples of the world who lived under divergent worldviews were viewed as unreasoned, unenlightened, and unchosen and thus subject to various forms of control and domination. When this effort at domination provoked resistance, modernists “externalized and projected” the violent disorder onto “the non-Western other, thus helping to stimulate the desire to penetrate, police and control, while at the same time validating a narcissistic Western identity.” . . .

Scholars analyze nations as products of the “invention of tradition” and as “imagined communities.” Nationalism evolved in an effort to unite common territories and pull together ethnic, regional, linguistic, and otherwise segmented communities. If nations are invisible, intangible, and fundamentally imagined, they therefore must be represented symbolically and in a manner reflecting the distinctiveness of a particular culture. Understanding the behavior of a state requires analysis extending beyond merely invoking the named community, as if what it represents reflects an ontological status, a universally accepted state of being. Thus one cannot

fully grasp the foreign policy of the United States without examining the nation's identity.

As they “settled” a putatively virgin land, the early Euro-American communities and then the United States had to be more fully imagined, had to do more to invent their traditions than most. [The historian] Louis Hartz long ago argued that “American exceptionalism” stemmed from the absence of the structure of the *ancien régime*—the centuries of European religious, monarchical, and aristocratic order. U.S. nationalism assumed overdetermined characteristics that created community bonds in the absence of those traditions undergirding the modern European nations. “If all states are ‘imagined communities,’ devoid of ontological being apart from the many practices that constitute their reality,” [the political scientist] David Campbell notes, “then [the United States] is the imagined community *par excellence*.” “America” became particularly dependent on representation to produce consent behind national identity.

I argue that foreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the process of creating, affirming, and disciplining conceptions of national identity. As Campbell puts it, U.S. foreign policy is “global in scope yet national in legitimation.” Only by analyzing the mutually reinforcing relationship between the domestic and the foreign, under the canopy of national identity, can we glean a clearer understanding of the functioning of power both at home and abroad. . . .

By their cultural production of otherness and hierarchy, racial and gendered perceptions underscore the critical linkages between foreign policy and domestic life. Ethnic cleansing of Indians and the enslavement of Africans fueled capitalism and freedom for white men. Likewise, exaltation of masculinity, the strenuous life, and “Be all you can be” brought young men into the military while at the same time empowering masculine virtues in invidious contrast with soft and sentimental characteristics ascribed to women. Foreign policy reinforced heterosexuality as well by linking campaigns against homosexuals, dubbed lavender boys, with anti-Communist containment or through the ongoing purges of gays and lesbians from the military.

Under U.S. national identity, foreign policy militancy and domestic cultural hegemony thus proved mutually reinforcing. The primacy of foreign policy, national security, and homeland security emphasized the traditional role of males as protectors of vulnerable women and children. The masculine virtues of assertiveness, preparedness, militancy, and technological know-how enabled the nation to emerge as the world's dominant nuclear power and arms merchant. Advocacy of peaceful and cooperative internationalism could be feminized as the purview of squaw men, pantywaists, and wimps.

Analysis of religion, like race and gender, “historicizes a connection between domestic culture and foreign policy,” as Seth Jacobs observes. Like the myth of a classless society, Myth of America identity fosters the illusion that in the United States freedom from religion prevails alongside freedom of religion. Religious faith permeates U.S. history and culture and carries profound domestic and foreign policy implications. . . .

Manifest Destiny, as myriad scholars have explicated, thus applies to far more than the Mexican War as a trope sanctifying the nation's mission of boundless

expansion. Religious faith profoundly influenced foreign policy, and especially war, as the United States confronted a procession of “heathen” enemies, “godless Communists,” and “evildoers” in a continuous history of violent conflict. . . . Much of the public viewed these apocalyptic struggles as divinely sanctioned reflections of national destiny. Victory in war, even the ultimate resolution of a bitter Civil War, affirmed the guiding hand of Providence. A critical mass of citizenry thus “continually reaffirmed . . . the conviction that America is a nation called to special destiny by God”. . . .

War—like nothing else—forges emotional bonds of unity, loyalty, and patriotism that powerfully reaffirm Myth of America identity. War spurred nation building and brought cathartic relief in the contexts of taming the frontier, Manifest Destiny, overseas imperialism, world war, the Cold War, and wars on terror. Although not all wars were popular, particularly when they became prolonged and inconclusive, they nearly always served to reaffirm national identity and cultural hegemony and to promote campaigns of countersubversion. . . .

Regenerative war intensified the bonds between the people and the abstraction of the nation. The promise of the nation, as the “beacon of liberty” for all mankind, inspired massive external violence. . . . War became associated with heroism and consensus as the nation came together like a “band of brothers” in the life-and-death struggles with evil enemy-others. By making the ultimate sacrifice, the nation’s war dead sanctified the Myth of America. They gave their lives that we might live, and such sacrifice could only be honored, not called into question.

While most Americans honored their obligation to support the troops, antiwar protesters subverted national identity. Advocates of peaceful internationalism thus find themselves policed, stigmatized as unpatriotic, and often incarcerated in a continuous series of countersubversive campaigns. War thus repeatedly functioned to reinforce cultural hegemony, diverting resources and attention away from peace internationalism and domestic inequalities, which might otherwise empower reform. Over the course of U.S. history, a succession of wars gradually erected a heavily militarized warfare and national security state. . . .

The point of emphasizing the constructed nature of national identity and foreign policy is to deconstruct the knowledge. Such analysis illuminates the ways in which knowledge and power are established, affirmed, disciplined, and policed against counterhegemonic challenges. Cultural analysis connects domestic identity and foreign policy, which too often are treated as being discrete rather than mutually dependent. . . .

Understanding derives not only from gleaning new knowledge, but also from unpacking and dispensing with some of the old. “Truths” must be interrogated and often delegitimated. I argue that the Myth of America and the pathologically violent foreign policy it inspires cannot remain unchallenged. The costs are too high, the consequences too great, both at home and abroad, to remain acquiescent. The hope is that broader public understanding of the constructedness of Myth of America identity can begin the process of trying to change it. Culture is organic, and societies are therefore susceptible to change, as the histories of Germany, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and many other nations and civilizations demonstrate.

Gender Analysis and Foreign Relations

LAURA MCENANEY

In the most basic sense, applying a gender analysis to the study of American foreign policy is an attempt to see things differently, or to see new things entirely. Like other tools of analysis, gender offers another angle, another peek into the complicated world of policymaking. Diplomatic historians who use gender analysis are no different than their colleagues in the field; they, too, seek answers to long-standing questions about the emergence of colonialism, the development of tariff and trade policies, the rise of anti-imperialist movements, the origins of the Cold War, and the like. The use of a gender analysis does not preclude the use of any of the customary methodologies of the historian; gender merely adds to the historian's toolbox. . . .

[T]he emergence of gender studies has made it possible for historians not only to find women but to see both women and men as gendered actors. Indeed, the research on women and femininity as historical subjects has inspired new investigation into the histories of men and masculinity. This has opened a rich vein of scholarship that does not take men's participation in foreign affairs for granted; rather, it interrogates how masculine values and worldviews have shaped diplomacy, enabling students of foreign policy to see anew how normative ideas about manhood inform policymakers' decision making in both domestic and international contexts.

But a gender analysis shows us more than masculinity in action; it offers a critical tool for understanding power in all of its guises. Seeing gender enables historians to scrutinize the organization of power in any arena, from the most public to the most intimate. Gender ideologies can represent relationships of power as innate, fixed, or biologically rooted, but gender history can make transparent the human agency behind those "natural" relationships. Gender analysis can also reveal how ideologies of masculinity and femininity are embedded in language and social structure; the language of warfare, for example, depends on gendered ideas of strength and weakness, protector and protected, which, in turn, shape how an institution like the military utilizes men and women to carry out American foreign policy. . . .

Cold War history offers an illustrative, although by no means exclusive, case of how gender analysis can affect the study of American foreign policy. It was in this field where scholars first began to commingle the study of politics, culture, and gender to expand traditional narratives of diplomatic history. . . .

Historians of the family and sexuality, for example, have explored how anti-communism and national security policies became manifest in everyday life. The ambient fear of nuclear annihilation, paired with concerns about the resilience of the nuclear family, spurred campaigns to "contain" the social forces that might prove disruptive to gender and family traditionalism. In fact, scholars have argued,

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postwar America's red scare was as much an attempt to root out nontraditional gender roles and sexual practices as it was an effort to secure America's foreign policy dominance. The preoccupation with national security abroad was bolstered by a security effort at home that enshrined "family values." According to popular cold warriors, with Joseph McCarthy being merely one of a chorus of voices, only heterosexual nuclear families with breadwinner fathers, stay-at-home mothers, and children could anchor a patriotic domestic security endeavor. Anything outside of that configuration was suspect, probably subversive, a potential menace to national security. . . .

[T]he first historians to do this work tended to look for a gender-foreign policy connection primarily in popular culture, leaving unanalyzed the gender content of the more traditional documents (letters, memos, telegrams, agency reports, treaties) found in presidential and security agency archives. In fact, there was arguably a kind of gendering of the sources themselves, whereby scholars who wanted to find gender in diplomacy tended to look at popular discourses (gendered feminine) rather than at the records of diplomacy (gendered masculine). This left the impression, as Amy Kaplan (1993) has argued, that gender "enters diplomatic history only through the aegis of culture." More recent scholarship on gender and Cold War foreign policy has built on these earlier approaches, and historians continue to fine-tune and adapt the methodologies of literary and cultural studies to traditional historical analysis of diplomacy. . . .

An examination of particular moments in Cold War history from the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations may help readers see how this work is done. Diplomatic historians have long debated questions about the emergence of chilly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. Volumes have been written about how the two superpowers sought military, economic, and territorial advantages as they tried to construct a postwar world hospitable to their own interests. Many scholars have focused on the development of the doctrine of containment, foreshadowed by the 1947 Truman Doctrine (which pledged the United States to fight communism in Greece and Turkey), and then articulated more thoroughly by George Kennan, the State Department analyst who penned the now famous "long telegram" in early 1946, followed by the "Sources of Soviet Conduct" article in July 1947. Historians have scrutinized Kennan's policy recommendations and rhetorical flourishes for decades, but until the late 1990s, no historians had done a close textual analysis that incorporated gender analysis. In fact, the question of how gender has shaped the political assumptions, worldviews, and policies of cold warriors has yet to be asked in a systematic way for the whole of the Cold War. Nevertheless, new studies have yielded some compelling findings on particular episodes in Cold War history.

Using the insights of gender studies, historian Frank Costigliola found that George Kennan's writings were rife with gendered metaphors that represented the Cold War as an emotional, sexually charged struggle between a man and woman. Kennan's favorite analogies to describe the changing postwar relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union depended heavily on gender, family, and sexual ideologies and imagery. For example, Kennan likened the relationship between Soviet citizens and their government to a wife who becomes gradually

disillusioned with her husband and seeks a divorce from him. Russian people, in general, were gendered feminine, Kennan's way of conveying his firm view that the Soviet citizenry was beholden to their cruel and despotic government, gendered as a hypermasculine authority figure. In his telegram, Kennan went so far as to portray the Soviet government as a rapist who tried to exert "unceasing pressure" with "penetration" into Western society. . . .

We can reach further back in time, to the nineteenth century, to apprehend gender meanings in American foreign policy. Kristin L. Hoganson's 1998 study about the operation of gender in the Spanish-American War, for example, nudges historians to confront difficult questions about the causal role of gender in American foreign policy decisions. Like the scholarship on gender and the Cold War, her study is premised on the notion "that the conduct of foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum, that political decision makers are shaped by their surrounding cultures," and that "inherited ideas about gender" are a part of that culture and thus shape profoundly the views of foreign policymakers. In the case of the Spanish-American War, Hoganson states that gender ideals "played an exceptionally powerful and traceable role" in the decision to go to war. Advocates of intervention in Cuba and the Philippines believed that international aggression would fortify American nationalism and manhood at the same time. They drew on nineteenth-century ideas about "manly" character and citizenship, arguing that a war for territorial and economic expansion would energize and rehabilitate American manhood, which, they claimed, had grown soft without the challenges of frontier expansion, agricultural production, and warrior experience. Layered upon these concerns was another: women's growing political activism and their insistence on the right to vote. An imperial war, according to interventionists, would certify gender traditionalism (man as protector, women as the protected) and restore the manly (and womanly) virtues and character that were the basis of American democracy. . . .

Whatever the century or whatever the case study, then, late-twentieth-century scholarship made big and insistent claims that gender ideologies were a fundamental part of foreign policy formulation. In all of the examples cited, it appears that gender shaped the identities of foreign policymakers themselves before they arrived in Washington, and that it continued to shape their assumptions, anxieties, aspirations, and actions once they were fully ensconced in diplomatic circles. . . .

[S]ince gender topics first appeared in the pages of diplomatic history journals, historians have debated the merits of gender analysis at conferences, in on-line forums, in journals, and in their own monographs. One of the reasons for this debate is that some of the gender-themed studies of American foreign relations gained momentum in fields outside of diplomatic history and, indeed, outside of the history discipline itself, in the more literary-focused arena of cultural studies. Skeptics of the gender approach have wondered aloud what diplomatic historians can learn from stories about sexual metaphors. . . . They have accused gender historians of paying too much attention to issues of representation at the cost of asking hard questions about causation. Some have argued that gender scholars have borrowed too heavily from other disciplines and have introduced questionable theories, methodologies, and insights into the field. . . .

While critics have argued that the new work on gender has better explained the connections between gender, culture, and diplomacy, rather than causation, those whose scholarship has been integral to this historiographical turn maintain that clear causation is hard to identify for any scholar, working on any problem, in any era. In fact, most gender scholars would agree that gender analysis does not explain reductively a single cause for a particular action, and that sometimes, gender meanings are not the most salient or significant aspects of a historical puzzle. Rather, they would argue, gender analysis abets the historian's effort to get closer to a reasonable and reliable set of explanations about a particular historical problem. Historians who seriously engage gender do not shy away from questions about causation, but they tend to approach overarching causal explanations with caution. The precise effect of George Kennan's "long telegram" on policymaking, for example, is impossible to discern, but it seems clear that his writings simplified what should have been a complex debate about Soviet intentions, and that his highly gendered, emotional musings naturalized—and thus rationalized—a set of diplomatic maneuvers that positioned the Soviets as unreliable allies and credible threats. In the case of the Spanish-American War, the societal panic about masculinity in decline reveals how gender "pushed" and "provoked" warfare as an antidote to the changes in nineteenth-century family and gender relations. . . .

Together, women's history and gender studies have enabled historians to conceive of foreign policy more broadly, inviting more actors, methods, and theories into the endeavor. A gender analysis offers one way to recast and expand the debates about the history of diplomacy. Its newness, relative to other approaches, has generated both excitement and skepticism, and as new work is published, historians will have new opportunities to debate its impact and merits.

The Adaptable Power of Racism

MICHAEL L. KRENN

The longevity of racism, particularly in terms of its role in U.S. foreign policy, is not difficult to understand. Throughout the years, racism has demonstrated remarkable adaptability to the needs of American diplomacy, incredible resiliency in the face of challenges, and undeniable power which, on occasion, has actually overridden the needs of U.S. foreign policy. The use of a few examples from America's past should suffice to prove these points.

Racism has never been a static element in American foreign policy. Instead, it has shown a truly amazing ability to adapt to the specific needs of U.S. diplomacy at different times in the nation's history. During the days of Manifest Destiny, racism quickly came to the aid of the arguments for territorial expansion. It seemed perfectly natural, indeed inevitable, that the white race would overrun and displace

The Adaptable Power of Racism from Michael L. Krenn, *The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations*, Potomac Books, Inc., 2006, pp. 103–107. Reprinted by permission of Potomac Books, Inc.

the weaker races. In this particular instance, the weaker race was the “mongrel” mixture of the Mexicans, and most Americans expressed little doubt (and less sympathy) when it came to the question of seizing Texas, the New Mexico territory, and California. The Mexicans—backward, lazy, stupid, and completely incapable of self-improvement—simply had to give way to the march of progress. It was, after all, the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Half a century later Americans were once again bent on expansion. This time, however, the goal was markets not territory. And now the people in these faraway lands were not to be displaced or annihilated, for they would provide both labor to extract the mineral and agricultural wealth demanded by the American market and consumers for American products. American racial thought, now in the thrall of social Darwinism, again served as a bulwark for U.S. expansion, subtly adapting itself to the new demands of American diplomacy. Now the goal of U.S. policy was couched in terms of “uplift” and “civilization.” It was painfully obvious that the peoples of Cuba, the Philippines, and other territories on which the American flag was planted were incapable of progress toward a civilized society if left to their own devices. They must be “freed” from the control of the inefficient (and racially suspect) Spaniards so that Yankee ingenuity could work its wonders on their primitive societies. The Louisiana Exposition [at the 1904 St. Louis World’s Fair] made the point in dramatic fashion. At the Philippine Reservation visitors could see for themselves the choice before the American nation: leave the natives to their barbaric savagery or raise them to an acceptable level of civilization. Miraculously, this was also part of the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Racism has also proven itself nearly invulnerable to attacks from a variety of directions. Early in its development, for instance, the concept of race had to fend off challenges from religion. How could there be different races if God created man in his own image—and in one place? Such was the resilience of racial thinking, however, that it easily withstood these theological assaults. Racism turned the Bible against itself, arguing that the Tower of Babel story explained the diversity of mankind, that the dispersion of the human race to far-off corners of the world resulted in different kinds of people who had adapted to their new environments. Eventually, those who strongly supported racial theories simply dispensed with the pretense of monogenesis and argued that in contrast to the Biblical story of creation there had, in fact, been any number of creations. Early nineteenth-century science put the final nail in the coffin by “proving” the diversity of mankind; going further, they even suggested that the differences resulted in a hierarchy of races ranging from the strongest and most civilized (the Anglo-Saxon) to the weakest and most degraded (sometimes black, sometimes Native American).

Yet, when science turned against racism in the 1920s and 1930s with the new emphasis on culture instead of biology as an explanation for human differences and when the horrors of the Nazi regime signaled the death knell of scientific racism, racial thinking mutated once again. Like a virus, racism insinuated itself into the debates on culture and “modernization” in the 1950s and 1960s. The differences between Western society and “traditional” societies were no longer

discussed in terms of skin color or cranial capacity but rather in terms of different cultural norms. Traditional societies just needed to be nudged into the “stages of economic growth.” Much of this thinking, however, was racist thinking in sheep’s clothing. Modernization theory still posited the same general thinking that lay behind American imperialism in the late nineteenth century: that traditional (i.e., nonwhite) societies were hopelessly and helplessly behind the modern (i.e., white) world. Only through the infusion of Western ideas into these cultures could they ever hope to move beyond their stagnant, backward status. In short, modernization depended on the acceptance of white leadership and the superiority of white culture. It was a rather remarkable feat. In the space of two hundred years, racism had beaten both religion and science to a standstill.

. . . [R]ace is [not] the only determinant of U.S. foreign policy. But to deny race’s role in American diplomacy is to have an incomplete understanding of the nature of America’s international relations. And in some cases, the power of racism has been overwhelming—even when its power runs contrary to what would appear to be the goals of U.S. policy. Let us take but two examples. In 1919 the United States met with the other victorious Allied powers at Versailles to bring an official end to World War I and chart the future of the world. When Japan surprised many of the delegates by putting forward a resolution for international racial equality, the moment seemed propitious for the United States to rather easily gain the respect and possibly friendship of a growing power in the Far East. The resolution itself was rather innocuous and its application to the international scene was never spelled out in any specifics. The United States, therefore, seemed to have little to lose by supporting the resolution. Relations with the Japanese had always been somewhat tense, and it was undeniable that Japan had become a major player in the diplomatic jousting in Asia. President Woodrow Wilson, however, could not break free from the stranglehold of racism. His own personal views on the inferiority of other races, the powerful strains of racism running through his own nation, and the pressure applied by his Anglo-Saxon allies to thwart any attempt to introduce racial equality into the international arena led Wilson to squash the resolution even after it passed by an overwhelming majority.

Four decades later the United States confronted a strange turn of events. Its racism had been turned back upon it by communist propaganda that consistently homed in on racial injustices inside the “leader of the free world.” America’s “Achilles’ heel,” as the race problem was referred to, was steadily losing the nation prestige among both friends and foes. The U.S. commitment to the ideals it consistently professed—equality, justice, and democracy—suffered blow after blow as incidents of racism multiplied, highlighted by the ugly scenes coming out of [the desegregation of Central High School in] Little Rock in 1957. The people of the world, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, were left to wonder whether America’s rhetoric had any basis in reality. To confront this international public relations nightmare, the United States embarked on a truly novel approach to propaganda in 1958. America decided to admit to the world at the World’s Fair in Brussels that it suffered from race problems, while at the same time suggesting that it was making progress in solving those problems and looked forward to the day when the United States would have a completely integrated society. It was a

brave but ultimately futile gesture. The forces of racism in America immediately mounted a counterattack and found a receptive audience in President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite evidence that indicated that the “Unfinished Business” exhibit was having a positive impact on the world’s perception of the United States, the American government first revised and then simply scrapped the section on segregation. Even in the heat of the Cold War, racism proved more powerful than national interest.

Given the history of racism in American foreign policy, what can we surmise about the future? The adaptability, resiliency, and power of racism suggest that we have not seen the end of its pernicious effects on the nation’s international relations. Talk about the growing interdependence of nations and the increasing “smallness” of our world brought about by greater communication and transportation is not altogether comforting, for proximity and contact with other peoples has not often resulted in greater sympathy or understanding from Americans. Suggestions that diversity, multiculturalism, political correctness, and acceptance now dominate the intellectual climate of our nation are welcome, but racism has taken on challengers before and always come out on top. Efforts to increase Americans’ knowledge of the world around them are laudable and altogether necessary. To argue that such knowledge in and of itself will lead to greater understanding and appreciation of other cultures only partially allays the fear that race will continue to impact America’s relations with the world. Unless the United States is willing to forcefully and consistently come to grips with the role of race in its own society and come face to face with the damage that racism has left in its wake, it seems likely that race and racism will continue to haunt us at home and abroad. When questions are raised now and in the future about the nation’s policies toward Africa, the Middle East, Asia, or Latin America, the strength and character of the United States demands that the answer, “I guess that’s just the way things are around here,” will no longer suffice.

Bureaucratic Politics and Policy Outcomes

J. GARRY CLIFFORD

In the mid-1960s, when members of the Harvard Faculty Study Group on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy began to write their scholarly tomes, their sometime colleague in the mathematics department, the irreverent folk singer Tom Lehrer, inadvertently gave song to what came to be called the “bureaucratic politics” approach to the study of U.S. foreign policy. In his ballad about a certain German emigre rocket scientist, Lehrer wrote: “Once the rockets are up / Who cares where they come down? / That’s not my department! / Said Wernher von Braun.” Lehrer’s

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ditty, by suggesting that government is a complex, compartmentalized machine and that those running the machine do not always intend what will result, anticipated the language of bureaucratic politics. The dark humor also hinted that the perspective might sometimes excuse as much as it explains about the foreign policy of the United States.

The formal academic version of bureaucratic politics came a few years later with the publication in 1971 of Graham T. Allison's *Essence of Decision*. Building on works by Warner R. Schilling, Roger Hilsman, Richard E. Neustadt, and other political scientists who emphasized informal bargaining within the foreign policy process, and adding insights from organization theorists such as James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Allison examined the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to counter the traditional assumption that foreign policy is produced by the purposeful acts of unified national governments. Allison argued that instead of behaving like a "rational actor," the Kennedy administration's actions during the crisis were best explained as "outcomes" of standard operating procedures followed by separate organizations (the navy's blockade, the Central Intelligence Agency's U-2 overflights, and the air force's scenarios for a surgical air strike) and as a result of compromise and competition among hawks and doves seeking to advance individual and organizational versions of the national interest. Allison soon collaborated with Morton H. Halperin to formalize the bureaucratic politics paradigm. Other scholars followed with bureaucratic analyses of topics including American decision making in the Vietnam War, the nonrecognition of China, the Marshall Plan, U.S.-Turkish relations, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) decision, nuclear weapons accidents, and U.S. international economic policy, as well as refinements and critiques of the Allison-Halperin model. The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard made bureaucratic politics the centerpiece of its new public policy program, and Allison became its dean. In 1999, his framework long since hailed as "one of the most widely disseminated concepts in all of social sciences," Allison and Philip Zelikow prepared an extensive, revised edition of *Essence of Decision* to refute political science theorists who "explain state behavior by system-level or external factors alone."

The Allisonian message holds that U.S. foreign policy has become increasingly political and cumbersome with the growth of bureaucracy. Diversity and conflict permeate the policy process. There is no single "maker" of foreign policy. Policy flows instead from an amalgam of organizations and political actors who differ substantially on any particular issue and who compete to advance their own personal and organizational interests as they try to influence decisions. Even in the aftermath of such national disasters as Pearl Harbor or the terrorist attacks of September 2001, turf wars proliferate because agencies reflexively resist reorganization and scapegoat others to avoid blame. The president, while powerful, is not omnipotent; he is one chief among many. For example, President Ronald Reagan may have envisaged his Strategic Defense Initiative (or "Star Wars") as a workable program to shield entire populations from the threat of nuclear war, but hardliners in the Pentagon saw it primarily as an antiballistic missile defense that would gain a technological advantage over the Soviet Union and stifle public agitation for more substantial arms control proposals.

Even after a direct presidential decision the “game” does not end because decisions are often ignored or reversed. Just as Jimmy Carter thought he had killed the B-1 bomber, only to see it revived during the Reagan years, so too did Franklin D. Roosevelt veto a “Pacific First” strategy in 1942, whereupon the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in historian Mark Stoler’s words, “formally submitted to his [FDR’s] orders but did so in such a way as to enable them to pursue a modified version of their alternative strategy” for the rest of World War II. Because organizations rely on routines and plans derived from experience with familiar problems, those standard routines usually form the basis for options furnished the president. Ask an organization to do what it has not done previously, and it will usually do what the U.S. military did in Vietnam: It will follow existing doctrines and procedures, modifying them only slightly in deference to different conditions.

Final decisions are also “political resultants,” the product of compromise and bargaining among the various participants. As Allison puts it, policies are “resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen . . . but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense [of] . . . bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of government.” Similarly, once a decision is made, considerable slippage can occur in implementing it. What follows becomes hostage to standard operating procedures and the parochial interests of the actors and agencies doing the implementing. Even when a president personally monitors performance, as John F. Kennedy tried to do during the missile crisis, organizational routines and hierarchies are so rigid and complex that the president cannot micro-manage all that happens. Not only did Kennedy not know that antisubmarine warfare units were routinely forcing Soviet submarines to the surface, thus precipitating the very confrontations he wanted to avoid, but the president was also unaware that NATO’s nuclear-armed fighter-bombers had been put on a nuclear Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), thus escaping the tight personal controls he had placed on Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.

The bureaucratic politics perspective also suggests that intramural struggles over policy can consume so much time and attention that dealing with external realities can become secondary. Virtually every study of nuclear arms negotiations from the Baruch Plan to START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Talks] confirms the truism that arriving at a consensus among the various players and agencies within the U.S. government was more complicated, if not more difficult, than negotiating with the Soviets. Ironically, officials who are finely attuned to the conflict and compartmentalization within the American government often see unitary, purposeful behavior on the part of other governments. Recall the rush to judgment about the Soviet shooting down of a Korean airliner in autumn 1983 as compared to the embarrassed and defiant explanations emanating from Washington when a U.S. navy spy plane collided with a Chinese jet and crash-landed on Hainan Island in 2001. When NATO forces carried out long-planned war games (Operation Able Archer) in the aftermath of the KAL 007 shoot-down, Washington experts scoffed at intelligence reports that Soviet leaders genuinely feared a nuclear first strike, calling it a disinformation ploy. Only President Reagan, as one scholar has noted, worried that “[Andrei] Gromyko and [Yuri] Andropov are just two players sitting on top of a large military machine” and that panic and

miscalculation might lead to Armageddon, so he told his startled senior advisers. Reagan's very next speech called for "nuclear weapons" to be "banished from the face of the earth."

Several important criticisms have been leveled at the bureaucratic politics approach. Some critics contend that ideological core values shared by those whom Richard J. Barnet has called "national security managers" weigh more in determining policy than do any differences attributable to bureaucratic position. The axiom "where you stand depends on where you sit" has had less influence, they argue, than the generational mindset of such individuals as McGeorge Bundy, Paul Nitze, John J. McCloy, and Clark Clifford, whose participation in the foreign policy establishment spanned decades and cut across bureaucratic and partisan boundaries. Because, as Robert S. McNamara later observed of the missile crisis, "you can't manage" crises amidst all the "misinformation, miscalculation, misjudgment, and human fallibility," other critics suggest that the framework lets decisionmakers off the hook by failing to pinpoint responsibility. Indeed, the president can dominate the bureaucracy by selecting key players and setting the rules of the game. Even though President Reagan once joked that "sometimes our right hand doesn't know what our far right-hand is doing," his defenders erred in absolving Reagan by blaming the Iran-contra affair on insiders "with their own agenda" who allegedly deceived the detached president by feeding him false information. Yet, as Theodore Draper has clearly demonstrated, at all top-level meetings on Iran-contra, President Reagan spoke more than any of his advisers, forcefully steered discussions, and made basic decisions, whether or not he subsequently approved every operational detail. The historian must be careful in each case to judge how much of the buck that stops with the president has already been spent by the bureaucracy. . . .

Yet such defeats in the bureaucratic politics approach may not hamper historians, who do not need models that predict perfectly. Unlike political scientists, they do not seek to build better theories or to propose more effective management techniques. Because the bureaucratic politics approach emphasizes state-level analysis, it cannot answer such system-level questions as why the United States has opposed revolutions or why East-West issues have predominated over North-South issues. It is better at explaining the timing and mechanics of particular episodes, illuminating proximate as opposed to deeper causes, and showing why outcomes were not what was intended. The bureaucratic details of debacles such as Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs invasion are thus better understood than the long-term dynamics of war and peace. . . .

When can the framework be most helpful? Because organizations function most predictably in a familiar environment, major transformations in the international system (wars and their aftermaths, economic crises, the Sino-Soviet split) require the analyst to study how these changes produce, however belatedly, institutional adjustments in U.S. policies. Equally propitious, even for the pre-Cold War era, are military occupations wherein the often clashing missions of diplomats and military proconsuls ("striped pants" versus "gold braid," in Eric Roorda's formulation) complicate the management of empire from Managua to Manila. So too are political transitions that bring in new players pledged to reverse the priorities of their predecessors, and particularly those administrations

in which the president, deliberately or not, encourages competition and initiative from strong-willed subordinates. Fiascos such as the U.S. failure to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Iran-contra affair not only force agencies to reassess procedures and programs but, even better, often spawn official investigations that provide scholars with abundant evidence for bureaucratic analysis. Budget battles, weapons procurement, coordination of intelligence, war termination, alliance politics—in short, any foreign policy that engages the separate attentions of multiple agencies and agents—should alert the historian to the bureaucratic politics perspective.

Consider, for example, the complex dynamics of American entry into World War II. Looking at the period through the lens of bureaucratic politics reveals that FDR had more than Congress in mind when making his famous remark: “It’s a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead—and to find no one there.” The institutional aversion to giving commissioned naval vessels to a foreign power delayed the destroyers-for-bases deal for several weeks in the summer of 1940, and only by getting eight British bases in direct exchange for the destroyers could Roosevelt persuade the chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold Stark, to certify, as required by statute, that these destroyers were no longer essential to national defense. According to navy scuttlebutt, the president threatened to fire Stark if he did not support what virtually every naval officer opposed and the admiral agonized before acquiescing. The army’s initial opposition to peacetime conscription, FDR’s dramatic appointment of Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox to head the War and Navy departments in June 1940, his firing of Admiral James O. Richardson for his opposition to basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, the refusal of the army and navy to mount expeditions to the Azores and Dakar in the spring of 1941, the unvarying strategic advice not to risk war until the armed forces were better prepared—all suggest an environment in which the president had to push hard to get the bureaucracy to accept his policy of supporting the Allies by steps short of war. Even the navy’s eagerness to begin Atlantic convoys in spring 1941 and the subsequent Army Air Corps strategy of reinforcing the Philippines with B-17s were aimed in part at deploying ships and planes that FDR might otherwise have given to the British and the Russians. . . .

In sum, this essay should be read as a modest plea for greater attention to bureaucratic politics. The perspective can enrich and complement other approaches. By focusing on internal political processes we become aware of the tradeoffs within government that reflect the cooperative core values posited by the corporatists or neo-realists. In its emphasis on individual values and tugging and hauling by key players, bureaucratic politics makes personality and cognitive processes crucial to understanding who wins and why. Bureaucratic hawks, as Frank Costigliola has noted, often use emotion-laden, gendered language to prevail over their dovish colleagues. Although bureaucratic struggles may be over tactics more than strategy, over pace rather than direction, those distinctions may matter greatly when the outcome is a divided Berlin and Korea, a second atomic bomb, impromptu hostage rescue missions that fail, or a military “exit strategy” that precludes occupation of the enemy’s capital. Too easily dismissed as a primer for managing crisis that should be avoided, the bureaucratic politics perspective also warns that when

“governments collide,” the machines cannot do what they are not programmed to do. Rather than press “delete” and conceptualize policy only as rational action, it is incumbent on historians to know how the machines work, their repertoires, the institutional rules of the game, the rosters, and how the box score is kept. The peculiarities of the U.S. checks-and-balances system of governance make such analysis imperative. The British ambassador Edward Lord Halifax once likened the foreign policy processes in Washington to “a disorderly line of beaters out shooting; they do put the rabbits out of the bracken, but they don’t come out where you would expect.” Historians of American foreign relations need to identify the beaters and follow them into the bureaucratic forest because the quarry is much bigger than rabbit.



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